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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After June Lynn Vazquez pled guilty to two separate charges of possession of a
controlled substance, the district court sentenced her to an aggregate sentence of ten years, with
three years fixed. Ms. Vazquez then moved for reconsideration of her sentences pursuant to
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”). The district court denied her motions. Ms. Vazquez appeals
to this Court.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In May of 2016, the State filed a Complaint (CR-FE-2016-5701) alleging Ms. Vazquez
committed the crimes of felony possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in
violation of I.C. § 37-2732(c), and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, in violation of
I.C. § 37-2734A. (R., pp.12–13.) These allegations arose from a traffic stop in which the police
found methamphetamine and paraphernalia in a car driven by Ms. Vazquez. (Presentence
Investigation Report (“PSI”),1 p.4.) The State subsequently amended the complaint to add
another misdemeanor offense for possession of a controlled substance, “bath salts.” (R., pp.44–
45.) Ms. Vazquez waived a preliminary hearing, and the magistrate bound her over to district
court. (R., pp.47–48, 49.) The State filed an Information charging Ms. Vazquez with possession
of methamphetamine, possession of bath salts, and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.50–
51.) The State also filed an Information Part II charging Ms. Vazquez as a persistent violator of
the law, pursuant to I.C. § 19-2514. (R., pp.58–59.)
1 Citations to the PSI refer to the 215-page electronic document containing the confidential
exhibits in both CR-FE-2016-5701 and CR01-15-33665.
2Then, in October of 2016, the State filed another Complaint (CR01-16-33665) alleging
Ms. Vazquez committed a second felony offense for possession of methamphetamine, plus two
misdemeanor offenses for driving without privileges, in violation of I.C. § 18-8001(3), and
providing false information to law enforcement, in violation of I.C. § 18-5413(2). (R., pp.133–
34.)  These  allegations  arose  from  another  traffic  stop  in  which  the  police  found
methamphetamine on Ms. Vazquez’s person. (PSI, p.4.) Ms. Vazquez waived a preliminary
hearing, and the magistrate bound her over to district court. (R., pp.149–51.) The State filed an
Information charging Ms. Vazquez with possession of methamphetamine, driving without
privileges, and providing false information to law enforcement. (R., pp.152–53.)
The district court consolidated these two cases. (R., p.100.) At the entry of plea hearing,
the State filed an Amended Information Part II in CR-FE-2016-5701 and an Information Part II
in CR01-16-33665 to charge Ms. Vazquez with a sentencing enhancement for a second or
subsequent drug offense under I.C. § 37-2739. (R., pp.102–03, 158–59.) Pursuant to a plea
agreement, Ms. Vazquez pled guilty to the possession of methamphetamine charge in both cases.
(Tr., p.13, L.19–p.16, L.6.) She also admitted to a prior drug offense for purposes of the
sentencing enhancement. (Tr., p.15, Ls.5–21.) The State agreed to recommend an aggregate
sentence of ten years, with three years fixed. (Tr., p.5, Ls.16–17.)
At sentencing, the State made a recommendation consistent with the plea agreement.
(Tr., p.19, L.6–p.24, L.19.) Ms. Vazquez requested a sentence of seven years, with one year
fixed. (Tr., p.28, Ls.8–9.) The district court followed the State’s recommendation, sentencing
Ms. Vazquez to ten years, with three years fixed, for each possession offense, to be served
concurrently. (Tr., p.31, Ls.21–23; R., pp.112–13, 172–73.) Ms. Vazquez filed a timely notice of
appeal in both cases. (R., pp.115–16, 175–76.)
3Then, in both cases, Ms. Vazquez moved for reconsideration of her sentence pursuant to
Rule 35. (R., pp.119, 179.) Along with each motion, she included a brief in support and attached
six letters written by family and friends. (R., pp.121–28, 181–88.) The district court issued an
order denying her motion in both cases. (Aug. R., pp.1–4.)
4ISSUES
I. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified aggregate sentence of
ten years, with three years fixed, upon Ms. Vazquez, following her guilty plea to two
counts of possession of a controlled substance?
II. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Vazquez’s Rule 35 motion?
5ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Aggregate Sentence Of
Ten Years, With Three Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Vazquez, Following Her Guilty Plea To Two
Counts Of Possession Of A Controlled Substance
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the  burden  of  showing  a  clear  abuse  of  discretion  on  the  part  of  the  court  imposing  the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Ms. Vazquez’s sentences do not exceed the statutory
maximum for possession of a controlled substance. See I.C. §§ 37-2732(c) (seven year
maximum), 37-2739 (sentencing enhancement to fourteen year maximum). Accordingly, to show
that the sentence imposed was unreasonable, Ms. Vazquez “must show that the sentence, in light
of the governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand,
137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
6Here, Ms. Vazquez asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, she contends the district
court should have sentenced her to a lesser term of imprisonment in light of the mitigating
factors, including her mental health and substance abuse issues, recent death of a close family
friend, employment history, and education.
Ms. Vazquez starting using methamphetamine at age seventeen. (PSI, pp.13–14.) Now, at
thirty-six years old, Ms. Vazquez has spent over half of her life battling her drug addiction. (PSI,
pp.1, 13–14.) Sobriety is one of the most important aspects of Ms. Vazquez’s life, but she often
turned to drugs and alcohol to cope with stress and trauma. (PSI, pp.13, 14.) For example,
Ms. Vazquez used illegal drugs to treat her mental health issues, which include severe depression
and bipolar disorder. (PSI, pp.12–13, 23, 28–30 (mental health evaluation).) Similarly, the
suicide of a close family friend (a father figure of Ms. Vazquez’s daughter) greatly contributed to
Ms. Vazquez’s most recent relapse. (PSI, pp.4, 10.) Ms. Vazquez acknowledged that, instead of
asking for help and taking her prescribed medications, she used drugs to “numb the feelings.”
(PSI, p.5.) These significant issues, however, do not require three years fixed in prison in order
for Ms. Vazquez to regain her sobriety. As argued by Ms. Vazquez’s trial counsel, one year fixed
is more than enough time for Ms. Vazquez to get sober and develop a plan to get the necessary
treatment for her mental health and substance abuse issues.
When sober, Ms. Vazquez leads a productive life and contributes to society. She obtained
her  GED  in  2011.  (PSI,  p.12.)  She  also  attended  the  College  of  Western  Idaho  for  two  years.
(PSI, pp.9, 12.) At one point, she had her own residence and lived with her daughter. (PSI, p.9.)
In addition, she has obtained employment as a housekeeper. (PSI, p.12.) She also worked in the
laundry in Ada County Jail. (PSI, p.12.) These facts show that ten years imprisonment, with three
7years fixed, is unreasonable. A lesser period of incarceration will serve the objectives of criminal
punishment while also allowing for Ms. Vazquez to get sober and refocus her life. In light of the
mitigating factors in this case, the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Vazquez’s Rule 35 Motions
Ms. Vazquez asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied her Rule 35
motions. Specifically, Ms. Vazquez contends the district court unduly limited the information it
considered before ruling on her motions. By limiting the information, Ms. Vazquez submits the
district court failed to act consistently with the applicable legal standards and failed exercise
reason in its decision.
The Court determines whether the district court abused its discretion by examining: “(1)
whether the court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted
within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently within the applicable legal
standards; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” State v.
Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, 574–75 (2017). The appellant must identify the pertinent factors to the
abuse of discretion assignment of error. Id. at 575 n.2.
“A Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence is essentially a plea for leniency, addressed
to the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Carter, 157 Idaho 900, 903 (Ct. App. 2014). In
reviewing the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion, the Court must “consider the entire record and
apply the same criteria used for determining the reasonableness of the original sentence.” Id. The
Court “conduct[s] an independent review of the record, having regard for the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest.” State v. Burdett,
8134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000). “Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce
a sentence under Rule 35,” the Court’s scope of review “includes all information submitted at the
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to reduce.” State v.
Araiza, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985). “When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant
must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
203 (2007). “An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to
review the underlying sentence absent the presentation of new information.” Id.
The district court abuses its discretion when it unduly limits the information it considers
before ruling on a Rule 35 motion. State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820, 824 (Ct. App. 2008);
State v. Puga, 114 Idaho 117 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. Torres, 107 Idaho 895, 898 (Ct. App.
1984).  Further, “[w]hen a judge refuses to consider any additional information, he erroneously
narrows the scope of his own discretion.” State v. Bonaparte, 114 Idaho 577, 582 (Ct. App.
1988), overruled on other grounds by statute as recognized in State v. Larson, 158 Idaho 130
(Ct. App. 2014).
Here, Ms. Vazquez filed a timely Rule 35 motion in both cases with new and additional
information. In support of her motions, she attached six letters of support from family and
friends. (R., pp.124–28, 184–88.) These six letters were listed in Ms. Vazquez’s identical briefs
in support of her motion. (R., pp.122, 182.) The first letter, from a hotel owner where
Ms. Vazquez had stayed, stated that Ms. Vazquez was “very open” about the obstacles in her life
and “would do what is [necessary] to overcome them . . . .” (R., pp.124, 184.) The second letter
was from a friend of five years, who met Ms. Vazquez when she chaired A.A. meetings.
(R., pp.125, 185.) She wrote that Ms. Vazquez was a “a good role model” and that she would “do
9everything” she could to support Ms. Vazquez and hold her accountable. (R., pp.125, 185.) A
former co-worker and friend of about ten years wrote the third letter. (R., pp.126, 186.) She
described Ms. Vazquez as supportive of others, able to “face any situation” with determination,
and open to learning from her mistakes. (R., pp.126, 186.) In the fourth letter, Ms. Vazquez’s
daughter wrote that she would support her mother by going to meetings with her, holding her
accountable, not condoning her actions, and helping her get a job. (R., pp.127, 187.)
Ms. Vazquez’s sponsor wrote the fifth letter, explaining that she, too, would hold Ms. Vazquez
accountable, help her build a healthy relationship with her daughter, help her get a job, and make
sure she went to her appointments on time. (R., pp.127, 187.) Finally, in the sixth letter, another
family friend stated that she would hold Ms. Vazquez to a high standard and make sure she
attended all classes and other appointments. (R., pp.128, 188.) In summary, these letters showed
Ms. Vazquez’s good character. They also showed Ms. Vazquez could rely on a strong support
network to help her stay sober, obtain employment, and develop positive relationships.
The district court did not consider this information when it denied Ms. Vazquez’s Rule
35 motions. In its orders denying the motions, the district court stated, “The defense submitted a
brief in support of the motion but no additional evidence.” (Aug. R., pp.1, 3 (emphasis added).)
This statement is unclear as to whether the district court (1) inadvertently missed the six letters
attached  to  the  Rule  35  motions  or  (2)  considered  the  letters  not  to  be  “new  or  additional
information,” as understood by Rule 35. Either way, Ms. Vazquez asserts the district court
abused its discretion. If the district court inadvertently missed the letters, the district court did not
reach its decision to deny the motions by an exercise of reason. The district court simply lacked
all the relevant information to make a well-reasoned decision. If, on the other hand, the district
court considered the information not to be “new or additional,” the district court failed to act
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consistently with the applicable legal standards. These letters were new and additional
information. They were not presented to the district court at sentencing. In fact, the most recent
PSI contained no letters or statements of support.2 (See PSI, pp.1–17.) These letters informed the
district court of Ms. Vazquez’s good character and strong support system, which are mitigating
factors for sentencing. See State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594–95 (1982); (family support and
good character as mitigation); see also State v. Ball, 149 Idaho 658, 663–64 (Ct. App. 2010)
(district court considered family and friend support as mitigating circumstances). New and
additional information has been described as “new evidence tending to show that the original
sentence was excessive.” State v. Carter, 157 Idaho 900, 903 (Ct. App. 2014). These letters meet
this standard. Further, the district court explained at sentencing that a minimum of three years in
prison was necessary in order for Ms. Vazquez to have a substantial period of sobriety.
(Tr., p.30, L.8–p.32, L.9.) The district court reasoned that Ms. Vazquez’s addiction must be
“dimmed enough” before she can participate in treatment in a meaningful way. (Tr., p.30, Ls.12–
p.31, L.1, p.32, Ls.3–9.) Ms. Vazquez’s good character and strong support system are extremely
relevant to Ms. Vazquez’s ability to overcome her drug addiction. In light of Ms. Vazquez’s
support system and her own determination to succeed, three fixed years to establish
Ms. Vazquez’s sobriety may be unreasonable. The district court likely would have reduced or
altered Ms. Vazquez’s sentence if the district court had considered the information in these six
letters. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by not considering these letters and thus
unduly limiting the information it considered before denying Ms. Vazquez’s Rule 35 motions.
2 The sentencing materials from earlier PSIs (2010, 2008, and 2006) and Addenda to PSIs (2009)
included letters of support. (PSI, pp.99, 123, 131, 135–138, 193–95, 215.)
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Vazquez respectfully requests that this Court reduce her sentence as it deems
appropriate or, in the alternative, vacate her judgments of conviction and remand these cases for
a new sentencing hearing. Alternatively, she respectfully requests that this Court vacate the
district court’s orders denying her Rule 35 motions and remand these cases for reconsideration of
her Rule 35 motions.
DATED this 1st day of June, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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